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ARTICLE
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I. Introduction

On July 1, 2013, Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 36.1 went into effect. 1 The stated purpose for
Rule 36.1 was straightforward: “to provide a mechanism for
the defendant or the State to seek to correct an illegal
sentence.” 2 To further effectuate that purpose, Tennessee
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 was also amended to reflect
the right of a defendant or the State to appeal an adverse Rule
36.1 ruling.3 Both purposes were designed to correct flaws
in the prior methods used to correct illegal sentences.4 But
then something strange happened. By late August of 2015,
there had been over seventy-five opinions filed by the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals dealing with Rule 36.1
motions.5 Most of these Rule 36.1 motions were “filed by
inmates in state or federal custody” long after the challenged
sentences “should have been fully served.”6 Most of these
cases involved claims “of an illegal concurrent sentence.”7
Why were large numbers of prisoners filing to correct illegal
1

TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1 (2013) (amended 2016).
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1 (2013), Advisory Comm’n Cmt. (amended
2016).
3
Id.
4
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tenn. 2015) (noting
that prior to the enactment of Rule 36.1 the State “had no mechanism for
seeking to correct illegal sentences”); State v. Moody, 160 S.W.3d 512,
516 (Tenn. 2005) (noting that direct appeal was not authorized for the
dismissal of a common law motion to correct an illegal sentence).
5
State v. Taylor, NO. W2014-02446-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 Tenn. Crim.
App. LEXIS 849, at *29–30 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2015)
(Holloway, J., concurring).
6
Id. at *30.
7
Id.
2
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sentences that were shorter than what had been statutorily
mandated?
The answer to that question laid in subsection (c)(3)
of the original text of Rule 36.1, which provided that if “the
illegal sentence was entered pursuant to a plea agreement”
and “the illegal provision was a material component of the
plea agreement,” the trial court was required to give the
defendant “an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea” and
to reinstate the original charge against the defendant if the
defendant chose to withdraw the plea. 8 Additionally, the
original text of Rule 36.1 simply stated that an illegal
sentence could be corrected “at any time.”9 Prisoners began
challenging sentences that had long ago expired in hopes that
they would be allowed to withdraw their pleas and,
ultimately, nullify their convictions, which had been used to
enhance other sentences. The floodgates had been opened.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals quickly
fractured over how to interpret Rule 36.1. Some members of
that court interpreted Rule 36.1 as allowing for the correction
of an illegal sentence even after it had expired. 10 Other
members of the court concluded that the doctrine of
mootness prevented Rule 36.1 from being used to challenge
8

TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(3) (2013) (amended 2016). This portion of
Rule 36.1 reflects the long-standing case law in Tennessee that a
defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea when an illegal sentence
is “a material element” of the plea agreement. See, e.g., Summers v.
State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d
871, 873 (Tenn. 1978). However, the inclusion of the ability to attack the
underlying conviction in Rule 36.1 appears to be unique to Tennessee
law. See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 834 (2016) (noting that,
generally, a motion to correct an illegal sentence “is not a vehicle for a
collateral attack on a conviction” and that “the relief available . . . is
correction of a sentence rather than reversal of a conviction”).
9
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a) (2013) (amended 2016).
10
State v. Talley, NO. E2014-01313-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7366257,
at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2014) (Woodall, P.J., concurring in the
judgment) (stating that, to him, “‘at any time’ means what it says,
whether before or after sentences have been fully served”).
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an expired sentence. 11 In State v. Brown, the Tennessee
Supreme Court rejected both of these interpretations and
held that Rule 36.1 did not “expand the scope of relief
available for illegal sentence claims” from what would have
been available if such claims were brought in a petition for
writ of habeas corpus and, therefore, did not “authorize the
correction of expired illegal sentences.” 12 In essence, the
Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that Rule 36.1
implicitly incorporated certain procedural requirements
from the state’s habeas corpus law. With that, the floodgates
were effectively closed.
This article will examine how the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s opinions in Brown and its companion case,
State v. Wooden,13 interpreted Rule 36.1 inconsistently with
the principles of statutory construction and overlooked
significant aspects of “the jurisprudential context from
which Rule 36.1 developed.”14 Part II of this article will take
a close look at Rule 36.1 and the reasoning of the Brown and
Wooden opinions. Part III will examine the “jurisprudential
context from which Rule 36.1 developed”15 and will discuss
how it was actually much broader than described in Brown.
Part IV will look at the plain language of Rule 36.1 and how
it was inconsistent with the Court’s interpretation of the Rule
in Brown. Part V will discuss how the definition of “illegal
sentence” found in Rule 36.1 was not a definition exclusive
to “the habeas corpus context”16 as was asserted in Brown
and Wooden. Part VI will examine the potential
“unconstitutional applications of Rule 36.1”17 described in
Brown and how that concern did not apply to the facts at
issue in Brown. Part VII will address the doctrine of
11

Id. at *3.
479 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tenn. 2015).
13
478 S.W.3d 585 (Tenn. 2015).
14
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 209.
17
Id. at 211.
12
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mootness and how it, likewise, did not apply to the facts at
issue in Brown. Part VIII will conclude the article by looking
at the recent amendment of Rule 36.1 and how it will, for
better or worse, bring the text of Rule 36.1 into agreement
with the Brown and Wooden opinions.
II. Rule 36.1, Brown, and Wooden
A. Rule 36.1

The original text of Rule 36.1 provided that either the
defendant or the State could, “at any time, seek the
correction of an illegal sentence by filing a motion to correct
an illegal sentence in the trial court in which the judgment of
conviction was entered.” 18 An “illegal sentence” was
defined for purposes of Rule 36.1 as a sentence “that is not
authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly
contravenes an applicable statute.”19 If the motion stated a
“colorable claim” alleging an illegal sentence and the
defendant was indigent, the original text of Rule 36.1
required the trial court to appoint an attorney to represent the
defendant. 20 The movant was required to “promptly
provide[]” notice of the motion to the adverse party. 21 The
adverse party was given thirty days to file a written response
to the motion, after which the trial court was required to
“hold a hearing on the motion, unless all parties waive[d] the
hearing.”22
Subsection (c) of the original text of Rule 36.1
outlined the possible outcomes of a Rule 36.1 motion. If the
trial court ultimately determined that the sentence was not

18

TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a) (2013) (amended 2016).
Id.
20
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(b) (2013) (amended 2016).
21
Id.
22
Id.
19
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illegal, it was required to file an order denying the motion.23
Should the trial court determine that the sentence was illegal
but that it was not entered pursuant to a guilty plea, it was
required to enter “an amended uniform judgment document”
reflecting “the correct sentence.” 24 If the illegal sentence
was entered pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court was
then required to determine whether the illegal sentence “was
a material component of the plea agreement.”25 If the illegal
sentence was not a material component of the plea
agreement, the trial court was required to enter an amended
judgment document reflecting the correct sentence. 26
Conversely, if the illegal sentence was a material component
of the plea agreement, the trial court was required to “give
the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea,”
and if the defendant so chose, to enter an order “reinstating
the original charge against the defendant.” 27 Rule 36.1
provided both the State and the defendant with the right to
appeal from the trial court’s disposition of a Rule 36.1
motion.28
B. State v. Wooden

The Tennessee Supreme Court examined Rule 36.1
for the first time in the companion cases of State v. Wooden29
and State v. Brown.30 In Wooden, the defendant filed a Rule
36.1 motion alleging that “the trial court increased his
sentence above the statutory presumptive minimum sentence
but failed to find enhancement factors justifying the

23

TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(1) (2013) (amended 2016).
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(2) (2013) (amended 2016).
25
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(3) (2013) (amended 2016).
26
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(4) (2013) (amended 2016).
27
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(3) (2013) (amended 2016).
28
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(d) (2013) (amended 2016).
29
478 S.W.3d 585, 586 (Tenn. 2015).
30
479 S.W.3d 200, 202 (Tenn. 2015).
24
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increase.” 31 The State responded by arguing that the
defendant’s “allegations were not sufficient to state a
colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1.”32 In addressing
Mr. Wooden’s argument on appeal, the court “determine[d]
the meaning of two terms used in Rule 36.1—‘colorable
claim’ and ‘illegal sentence.’”33
After noting that “Rule 36.1 does not define
‘colorable claim,’”34 the court referred to the definition of
the term used “for purposes of post-conviction relief . . . .”35
Specifically, the court noted that “colorable claim" was
defined in the post-conviction context as “a claim, in a
petition for post-conviction relief, that, if taken as true, in the
light most favorable to petitioner, would entitle petitioner to
relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.”36 The court
concluded that “the term has the same general meaning in
both [post-conviction and Rule 36.1] contexts,” and held that
“for purposes of Rule 36.1, . . . ‘colorable claim’ means a
claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most
favorable to the moving party, would entitle the moving
party to relief under Rule 36.1.”37
With respect to the term “illegal sentence,” the court
stated that the Rule 36.1 definition “mirror[ed] that
[definition] adopted” in Cantrell v. Easterling, which
“defin[ed] the term for purposes of habeas corpus petitions
seeking correction of illegal sentences.” 38 The court held
that “the definition of ‘illegal sentence’ in Rule 36.1 . . .
[was] coextensive with, and not broader than, the definition
of the term in the habeas corpus context,” and that holding
31

Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 587.
Id. at 589.
33
Id. at 587.
34
Id. at 592.
35
Id.
36
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TENN. SUP. CT. R. 28,
§ 2(H)).
37
Id. at 593.
38
Id. at 594.
32

[39]
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otherwise would require it “to ignore the plain language of
Rule 36.1 and of Cantrell.”39 The court ultimately concluded
that Mr. Wooden’s allegations were “insufficient to state a
colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1”40 because even if
the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence, it was still
“statutorily available for the offense of which he was
convicted” and, therefore, not illegal.41
C. State v. Brown

In Brown, the defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion alleging:
[T]hat his sentences [were] illegal because . .
. the trial court failed to award him pretrial
jail credit[,] . . . the trial court imposed sixyear sentences . . . when his plea agreement
called for three-year sentences[,] . . . and[,]
[like the defendant in Wooden,] the trial court
imposed sentences above the presumptive
statutory minimum . . . without finding
enhancement factors.42
In the Brown opinion, the court framed the issues as
“whether Rule 36.1 expand[ed] the scope of relief available
for illegal sentence claims . . . [to allow for] correction of
expired illegal sentences,” and whether the failure to award
pretrial jail credit was “a colorable claim for relief . . . under
Rule 36.1.”43
Regarding the first issue, the State conceded that
“Rule 36.1 [allowed for] the correction of expired illegal
39

Id. at 594–95.
Id. at 596 (internal footnote omitted).
41
Id.
42
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 202–03 (Tenn. 2015) (internal
footnotes omitted).
43
Id. at 205.
40
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sentences” and agreed with Mr. Brown’s interpretation of
Rule 36.1. 44 The court began its analysis of the issue by
noting that the same rules used to construe statutes are used
in construing rules of procedure like Rule 36.1.45 In regard
to interpreting procedural rules, the court stated that courts
“need not look beyond the plain language [of the rule] to
ascertain [its] meaning” if “the text is clear and unambiguous
. . . .” 46 Put another way, courts “are constrained . . . to
construe the language [of a rule] in a way that is natural,
ordinary, and unforced.”47 Additionally, courts “interpret a
procedural rule in light of the law existing at the time the
procedural rule was adopted.” 48 In doing so, “courts may
presume that the [drafter] knows the ‘state of the law.’”49
After stating these rules, the court then reviewed “the
development of Tennessee law regarding the correction of
illegal sentences . . . .”50
The court noted that, generally, “a trial court’s
judgment becomes final thirty days after entry . . . [or] upon
[the] ‘entry of the order denying a new trial’” or another
specified post-trial motion,51 and that “a trial court has no
power to alter a final judgment.”52 The court also noted the
exception to this rule recognized in the 1978 case State v.
Burkhart, where the Tennessee Supreme Court “held that ‘a
44

Id. at 210.
Id. at 205 (citing State v. Johnson, 342 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tenn. 2011)).
46
Id. at 205 (citing Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527
(Tenn. 2010)).
47
Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795, 808 (Tenn. 2015).
48
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 205 (citing Beecher, 312 S.W.3d at 527).
49
Beecher, 312 S.W.3d at 527 (quoting Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A.
v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 2005)).
50
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 205.
51
Id. at 205–06 (quoting TENN. R. APP. P. 4(c)) (citing State v. Green,
106 S.W.3d 646, 648–49 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Peele, 58 S.W.3d 701,
704 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn.
1996)).
52
Id. at 206 (citing Green, 106 S.W.3d at 648–49; Peele, 58 S.W.3d at
704; Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837).
45

[41]
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trial judge may correct an illegal, as opposed to a merely
erroneous, sentence at any time, even if it has become
final.’”53 However, when the Tennessee Rules of Criminal
Procedure became effective in 1979, they did not “specify
any procedure for making such requests,” 54 and “the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which also became
effective in 1979, did not authorize an appeal as of right from
a trial court’s decision on a motion to correct an illegal
sentence.” 55 Instead, defendants seeking to challenge an
illegal sentence followed the procedure that was used in
Burkhart, which was to file a motion to correct the illegal
sentence in the trial court and then rely “upon the
discretionary common law writ of certiorari to seek appellate
review of trial court orders . . . .”56
After reviewing the rule and procedure found in
Burkhart, the court examined its 2005 opinion in Moody v.
State and concluded that Moody reaffirmed “the rule
announced in Burkhart—that an allegedly illegal sentence
may be challenged at any time, even after it is final,” but that
Moody rejected “the Burkhart procedure.” 57 The court
quoted the holding in Moody, stating that “the proper
procedure for challenging an illegal sentence at the trial level
[was] through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the grant
or denial of which [could] then be appealed under the Rules
of Appellate Procedure.”58 In Brown, the court reasoned that
53

Id. (quoting State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978)).
Id. (citing Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 453 (Tenn. 2011)).
55
Id. at 206 (internal footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Moody, 160
S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tenn. 2005)).
56
Id. at 206 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 515). In fact, “[t]he common
law writ of certiorari [is] codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section
27-8-101,” and is available when the trial court has acted “without legal
authority and where no other ‘plain, speedy or adequate remedy’ is
available.” Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 278-101 (2000)) (citing State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tenn. 2002)).
57
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 206 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516).
58
Id.
54

[42]
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“[b]y adopting habeas corpus as the mechanism for
challenging illegal sentences, the Moody Court implicitly
limited the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims to
unexpired illegal sentences.”59 The court reasoned this was
because habeas corpus relief is statutorily limited to persons
“imprisoned or restrained of liberty” 60 and that it had
previously held, in the habeas corpus context, that “[u]se of
the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on
a separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to
permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction
long after the sentence on the original conviction has
expired.”61
The Brown opinion asserted that it was “[a]gainst this
jurisprudential backdrop” that Rule 36.1 was adopted.62 The
court then turned to the text of Rule 36.1, noting that Rule
36.1 differed “from the procedure applicable to habeas
corpus petitions challenging illegal sentences” in that it
allowed the State to seek correction of an illegal sentence
and that the motion was to be filed in the trial court where
the judgment of conviction was entered rather than the
county where the defendant was incarcerated. 63 The court
asserted that Rule 36.1 was “identical to habeas corpus in
other respects” but cited only its conclusion in Wooden to
support the proposition that definition of “illegal sentence”
in Rule 36.1 was “coextensive with, and actually mirror[ed],
the definition [the] Court [had] applied to that term in the
habeas corpus context.”64
The court also reasoned that the phrase “at any time”
had “no bearing on whether Rule 36.1 authorizes relief from
59

Id.
Id. at 206–07 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-21-101(a) (2012)).
61
Id. at 207 (quoting Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tenn.
2004)).
62
Id. at 208.
63
Id. at 209 (quoting TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a)).
64
Id. at 209 (citing State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585 (Tenn. 2015)).
60

[43]
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expired illegal sentences.”65 Instead, the court asserted that
the phrase was designed to convey that illegal sentences
could be challenged even after the judgment became final
and that, like habeas corpus petitions, Rule 36.1 motions
were “not subject to any statute of limitations.”66 The court
further asserted that the phrase “at any time” “simply [did]
not answer the question of whether Rule 36.1 permit[ed] the
correction of expired illegal sentences” because “the text of
Rule 36.1 [was] silent” on this point.67 The court admitted
that “one possible interpretation of this silence [was] that
Rule 36.1 authorize[d] the correction of expired illegal
sentences . . . .” 68 However, the court rejected this
interpretation, finding that it was “not reasonable in light of
the expressed purpose of Rule 36.1, its language, and the
jurisprudential background from which it developed.”69
The court then reasoned that
Rule 36.1 was adopted “to provide a
mechanism for the defendant or the State to
seek to correct an illegal sentence.” Neither
the comments to Rule 36.1 nor its text
suggest that it was intended to expand the
scope of relief available on such claims by
permitting the correction of expired illegal
sentences. Had such an expansion been
intended, Rule 36.1 would have almost
certainly
included
language
clearly
expressing that intent, given its inconsistency
with this Court’s prior decisions refusing to
grant habeas corpus relief for expired illegal
sentences. That Rule 36.1 was not, in fact,
65

Id. at 210.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
66
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intended to expand the scope of relief for
illegal sentence claims is evidenced by the
portion of Rule 36.1 defining “illegal
sentence” exactly as this Court had already
defined that term in the habeas corpus
context.70
The court also asserted that interpreting Rule 36.1 to
allow for the correction of expired sentences could
“potentially produce absurd, and even arguably
unconstitutional, results.” 71 The court argued that if Rule
36.1 allowed the State to correct an illegally lenient sentence
after it had been served, defendants would likely argue that
such an action would violate constitutional protections
against double jeopardy. 72 The court concluded that the
“outcry would be unimaginable” if the State were to “start
using Rule 36.1 to jail untold numbers of citizens that by all
indications [had] completely served their sentences. . . .”73
As such, the court held “that Rule 36.1 [did] not expand the
scope of relief [from what was available in a habeas corpus
proceeding] and [did] not authorize the correction of expired
illegal sentences.”74
In so holding, the court rejected the argument
propounded by some members of the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals that claims regarding expired sentences
were moot. The Court noted that in the habeas corpus
context, a challenged conviction’s “collateral consequences
may prevent a habeas corpus petition from becoming moot,”
but the fact that the claim is not moot does not mean that it
70

Id. at 210–11 (internal citation omitted) (quoting TENN. R. CRIM. P.
36.1, Advisory Comm’n Cmt.).
71
Id. at 211.
72
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Selavka, 14 N.E.3d 933, 941 (2014)).
73
Id. at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lee v. State, NO.
W2014-00994-CCA-R3-CO, 2015 WL 2330063, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.
App. May 13, 2015) (Williams, J., dissenting)).
74
Id. at 211.
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will fall “within the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction.”75
Because the court had interpreted Rule 36.1 as implicitly
limiting the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims to
unexpired illegal sentences, the court concluded that
“[c]ollateral consequences may prevent a case from
becoming moot in the traditional sense of the mootness
doctrine, but Rule 36.1 [was] not an appropriate avenue for
seeking relief from collateral consequences.”76
The court then examined the issue of whether failure
to award pretrial jail credit was a colorable claim for Rule
36.1 relief and held it was not. 77 The court concluded its
opinion by addressing Mr. Brown’s claim that the trial court
erroneously imposed six-year sentences rather than threeyear sentences as provided by the plea agreement. 78 The
court concluded that the mistake was a mere clerical error
that could be corrected pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.79 Rule 36 also contained the phrase
“at any time.” The court reasoned that “[p]ermitting
correction of the clerical error pursuant to Rule 36 despite
the expiration of [the] sentence [did] not contravene [its]
75

Id. at 211–12 n.12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting May v.
Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 356 (Tenn. 2008) (Koch, J., dissenting)).
76
Id. at 212 n.12.
77
Id. at 212–13. The court did so despite the fact that the awarding of
pretrial jail credits is statutorily mandated. T ENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23101(c) (2012). The court reasoned that pretrial jail credits did not alter
the sentence itself; rather, they merely affected “the length of time a
defendant is incarcerated.” Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 212. The court
concluded, therefore, that the denial of pretrial jail credits could never
render a sentence illegal. Id. at 213. Instead, a trial court’s failure to
award pretrial jail credits could be challenged on direct appeal. Id. at
212–13. It remains to be seen whether this holding forecloses postconviction or habeas corpus relief for defendants erroneously deprived
of pretrial jail credits or is merely limited to Rule 36.1 relief.
78
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 213.
79
Id.; see also TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36 (stating that a trial court “may at
any time correct clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of
the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission”).
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principal holding that Rule 36.1 [did] not authorize courts to
grant relief from expired illegal sentences.” 80 The court
further reasoned that “[c]orrecting clerical errors so that the
record accurately reflects the sentence imposed [did] not
amount to granting relief from expired illegal sentences.”81
As such, the court remanded the case to the trial court for
correction of the clerical error pursuant to Rule 36.82
III. “Jurisprudential Context” of Rule 36.1
A. Common Law Motions to Correct Illegal Sentences

As noted in Part II, the Tennessee Supreme Court
first dealt with the issue of a trial court’s inherent power to
correct illegal sentences in the 1978 case of State v.
Burkhart.83 At issue in Burkhart was the trial court’s failure
to order, as mandated by statute, two sentences to be served
consecutively.84 Mr. Burkhart was convicted of “burglary in
the first degree,” escaped from prison, was subsequently
convicted for the escape, and sentenced to one year in prison
running from the day of his conviction. 85 When the State
Department of Correction realized that this, in effect, would
allow the prisoner to serve his two sentences concurrently
(contrary to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-3802), it
notified the prisoner that he would have to serve his sentence
for the escape after his sentence for burglary concluded.86
Mr. Burkart petitioned the trial court to prevent the State
Department of Corrections from altering the terms of his
sentence; however, the trial court, realizing its mistake,

80

Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 213.
Id.
82
Id.
83
State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 1978).
84
Id. at 872.
85
Id.
86
Id.
81
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denied the petition. 87 On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme
Court held that the trial court had the inherent power to
correct the defendant’s illegal sentence, stating that “the
judgment entered in the trial court . . . was in direct
contravention of the express provisions of [a statute], and
consequently was a nullity.”88 The court further stated that
“the trial judge . . . had both the power, and the duty, to
correct the judgment . . . as soon as its illegality was brought
to his attention.”89 The court held that “[a]s a general rule, a
trial judge may correct an illegal, as opposed to a merely
erroneous, sentence at any time, even if it has become
final.”90
In Burkhart, the court did not state its rationale for
holding that a trial court could correct an illegal sentence.
However, the court did cite to several cases from other
jurisdictions that establish the source of a trial court’s power
to correct illegal sentences. 91 In State v. Culver, the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated that a trial court’s “power to
punish criminal offenders . . . would seem naturally to
include the power to correct the sentences imposed by it.”92
The New Jersey Supreme Court then held that when a trial
court has imposed an illegal sentence “the court’s
jurisdiction to impose a correct sentence [would not expire]
until a valid sentence was imposed.”93 Likewise, the Iowa
Supreme Court held in State v. Shilinsky that “[u]ntil a valid
judgment [is] entered, the [trial] court [does] not exhaust its
jurisdiction, and might be required to correct any
87

Id.
Id. at 873.
89
Id.
90
Id. (citing State v. Leathers, 531 P.2d 901 (Or. 1975); Frazier v.
Langlois, 240 A.2d 152 (R.I. 1968); State v. Fountaine, 430 P.2d 235
(Kan. 1967); In re Sandel, 412 P.2d 806 (Cal. 1966); State v. Shilisnky,
81 N.W.2d 444 (Iowa 1957); State v. Culver, 129 A.2d 715 (N.J. 1957)).
91
Id.
92
Culver, 129 A.2d at 720.
93
Id. at 724.
88
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irregularities by pronouncing a valid sentence and entering a
valid judgment.”94 This is so because, as noted by the Kansas
Supreme Court in State v. Fountaine, “a void sentence in
contemplation of law is non-existent.”95 Therefore, as held
by the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Leathers, a trial
court that has imposed an illegal sentence “has not exhausted
its jurisdiction [because] it has in fact failed to pronounce
any sentence.”96 This reasoning regarding illegal sentences
was in line with Tennessee case law of the time, which
maintained that “where a judgment is void then there is no
judgment and consequently the [trial] court does not lose
jurisdiction over the matter.” 97 Yet, the court’s opinion in
Brown made no mention of these cases in its discussion of
the jurisprudential context of Rule 36.1.
B. Illegal Sentence Claims in the Years Between
Burkhart and Moody

In the years following Burkhart, the Tennessee
Supreme Court, on at least two occasions in State v. Mahler98

94

Shilinsky, 81 N.W.2d at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Nelson v. Foley, 223 N.W. 323, 324 (S.D. 1929)).
95
Fountaine, 430 P.2d at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States v. Howell, 103 F. Supp. 714, 718 (S.D.W. Va.
1952)).
96
State v. Leathers, 531 P.2d 901, 303 (Or. 1975) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Nelson, 424 P.2d 223, 225 (Or. 1967)).
97
Tennessee ex rel. Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tenn.
1951). This reasoning was also in line with the purpose of the original
text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), which provided that a
federal district court could “correct an illegal sentence at any time.” See
United States v. James, 709 F.2d 298, 307–08 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting
that Rule 35 was designed to continue the existing decisional law which
recognized that a district court’s power to correct an illegal sentence
“sprang from the court’s want of jurisdiction to impose [an] illegal
sentence in the first place”).
98
State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987).
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and McConnell v. State,99 addressed illegal sentence claims
that had been raised as part of a petition for post-conviction
relief. Again, the Brown opinion made no reference to these
cases in its discussion of the jurisprudential context of Rule
36.1. Meanwhile, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
was more vexed by the question of how to procedurally treat
a motion to correct an illegal sentence. For example, in State
v. Reliford, 100 a panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals
addressed a defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s
dismissal of his motion to correct his sentences. 101 The
Reliford opinion noted that there was no direct appeal as of
right from the trial court’s dismissal.102 However, citing the
holding of Burkhart, the panel reasoned that “[l]ogic
dictate[d] that some avenue of appeal [lay] from an adverse
ruling of the trial court” and elected to treat the defendant’s
appeal as a common law petition for writ of certiorari. 103
Citing to Mahler and McConnell, the panel concluded that
the defendant’s sentence was illegal. 104 Specifically, the
panel noted that “[s]entencing is jurisdictional and must be
executed in compliance with the applicable legislative
mandates” and that trial courts lack “the statutory authority
to impose a sentence . . . that deviate[s] from the penalties
proscribed by law.”105
In an opinion filed eleven days after Reliford, a
separate panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that
“the appropriate procedure for challenging a void sentence

99

McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 796 (Tenn. 2000).
State v. Reliford, NO. W1999-00826-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL
1473846 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2000).
101
Id. at *1.
102
Id. at *2.
103
Id.
104
Id. (quoting State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987)).
105
Id. at *2 (citing McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 798–800 (Tenn.
2000)).
100
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is a petition for habeas corpus relief.”106 The panel reasoned
that a petition for habeas corpus relief is “the appropriate
procedure” because “[i]n cases arising from criminal
convictions, the remedy of habeas corpus relief applies when
the judgment is void.”107 However, the panel then stated that
“because an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time,
[it did] not believe that the defendant’s failure to seek habeas
corpus relief necessarily deprive[d] him of appellate
review.” 108 Citing to Reliford, the panel concluded that a
defendant could “pursue appellate review from the denial of
a motion to correct an illegal sentence through the common
law writ of certiorari.”109 The panel ultimately declined to
grant the defendant an appeal after concluding, on the merits,
that his sentence was not illegal.110
Less than a year later, in April 2001, a third panel of
the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the procedural
nature of illegal sentence claims in a published opinion,111
Cox v. State.112 In outlining its analysis of the issue, the Cox
opinion stated that

106

State v. Jones, NO. M2000-00381-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1520012,
at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2000) (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28
S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2000)). The long-standing rule in
Tennessee is that “the writ of habeas corpus will issue only in the case
of a void judgment or to free a prisoner after his term of imprisonment
or other restraint has expired.” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255
(Tenn. 2007) (citing Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992)).
107
Jones, 2000 WL 1520012, at *2 (citing Passarella v. State, 891
S.W.2d 619, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d
157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)).
108
Id. at *2.
109
Id. (citing State v. Reliford, NO. W1999-00826-CCA-R3-CD, 2000
WL 1473846, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2000)).
110
Id. at *3–4.
111
Published opinions are controlling authority in Tennessee state courts
until they are reversed or modified by a court of competent jurisdiction.
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 4(G)(2).
112
53 S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
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[t]he key to analyzing these collateral attacks
on sentences is to appreciate that the phrase
“illegal sentence” as used in our caselaw [sic]
is a term of art that refers to sentences
imposed by a court that is acting beyond its
jurisdiction—that is to say, sentences that
result from void judgments. The upshot of
our analysis [would] be that habeas corpus is
the preferred, if not the only, method of
collaterally attacking void sentences and that
collateral attacks that assert lesser claims of
merely erroneous or voidable sentences are
generally doomed, unless by nature they fit
within some other recognized form of
action.113
This panel reasoned that “[t]he distinction made in Mahler
and Burkhart between erroneous, voidable sentences . . . and
illegal or void sentences . . . call[ed] to mind the scope of the
writ of habeas corpus” and that “the phrase ‘illegal sentence’
[was] synonymous with the habeas corpus concept of a
‘void’ sentence.” 114 Noting that “a claim that merely
assert[ed] a void sentence, even though it may not assert a
void conviction, [was] cognizable as a habeas corpus
proceeding,” the panel concluded that “the better method of
challenging illegal or void sentences [was] via an application
for a writ of habeas corpus.”115 The panel further noted that
“illegal or void sentence claims” sounding in a habeas
corpus proceeding would “be subject to dismissal [for]
fail[ing] to meet the procedural requirements” of such a

113

Id. at 291.
Id. at 291–92 (citing Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn.
1993)).
115
Cox, 53 S.W.3d at 292 (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910,
911 (Tenn. 2000)).
114
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proceeding.116 However, the panel recognized that an illegal
sentence claim could be brought in a petition for postconviction relief. 117 Likewise, the panel recognized that,
while they should “rarely be granted,” appeals via the
common law writ of certiorari were available for claims that
rose “to the level of illegality or voidness.”118
C. Habeas Corpus Cases

It was against this backdrop that the Tennessee
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Moody v. State. In
Brown, it is asserted that Moody stands as a rejection of “the
Burkhart procedure” because “[b]y adopting habeas corpus
as the mechanism for challenging illegal sentences, the
Moody court implicitly limited the scope of relief for illegal
sentence claims to unexpired illegal sentences.” 119
Underpinning the Brown court’s reasoning is the assumption
that Moody adopted habeas corpus as the exclusive
procedural vehicle for challenging illegal sentences.
However, a close reading of Moody indicates that may not
be true.
The court in Moody took the “opportunity to clarify
the proper procedure for seeking review of illegal sentence
claims at both the trial level and on appeal.” 120 The court
held that the Cox opinion’s “reliance on Burkhart as
supporting certiorari review of the denial of a motion to
correct an illegal sentence [was] misplaced” because
Burkhart was decided prior to the adoption of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which were “intended to replace the
appellate court procedure that was governed by scattered
provisions of the Tennessee Code and the rules and decisions
116

Id. at 293.
Id.
118
Id. at 294.
119
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 206 (Tenn. 2015).
120
State v. Moody, 160 S.W.3d 512, 515 (Tenn. 2005).
117
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of the appellate courts.” 121 Noting that the Rules of
Appellate Procedure did not “authorize a direct appeal of a
dismissal of a motion to correct an illegal sentence[,]”
Moody clarified “that the proper procedure for challenging
an illegal sentence at the trial level [was] through a petition
for writ of habeas corpus, the grant or denial of which
[could] then be appealed under the Rules of Appellate
Procedure.” 122 The fact that the summary dismissal of a
habeas corpus petition could be challenged on appeal was
one of the key factors in the court’s holding. The court
further clarified that because a defendant could use a habeas
corpus proceeding to challenge an illegal sentence, “the writ
of certiorari [was] not available to review an illegal sentence
claim that [had] been presented through a motion.”123
However, in so holding, the court noted that “[a] void
or illegal sentence also [could] be challenged collaterally in
a post-conviction proceeding when the statutory
requirements are met.”124 Concluding the opinion, the court
restated its holding that “[a] habeas corpus action [was] the
proper procedure for collaterally challenging an illegal
sentence,” but then stated that “[a]lthough a trial court may
correct an illegal sentence at any time, appellate courts may
not review the denial of a motion to correct an illegal
sentence through the common law writ of certiorari.” 125
These two aspects of the Moody opinion were not mentioned

121

Id. at 516 (citing State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.
1978)).
122
Id. at 516 (emphasis added) (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d
910, 912 (Tenn. 2000)).
123
Id. at 516 (citing State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tenn. 2002)).
124
Id. at 516 n.2 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d
226, 228 (Tenn. 1987)). Post-conviction relief is available “when the
conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of
any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution
of the United States.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-103 (2012).
125
Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516 (emphasis added).
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by the court in Brown.126 Contrary to the assertion in Brown
that Moody established habeas corpus as the sole procedural
vehicle for challenging an illegal sentence, Moody directly
stated that illegal sentences could be challenged in a postconviction proceeding as well as a habeas corpus
proceeding.127 Furthermore, Moody also directly stated that,
while there was no method for direct appeal from a motion
to correct an illegal sentence, trial courts continued to retain
their inherent power to correct an illegal sentence at any
time.128
Two years after Moody, the Tennessee Supreme
Court addressed whether an expired illegal sentence could
be challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding in Summers v.
State.129 The court began its analysis by restating the rule
that “[a] sentence imposed in direct contravention of a
statute is void and illegal.”130 The court then declared that
“[a] trial court may correct an illegal or void sentence at any
time” before reaffirming the holding of Moody that “[a]
habeas corpus petition, rather than a motion to correct an
illegal sentence, is the proper procedure for challenging an
illegal sentence.”131 However, in restating these principles,
the court again noted that an illegal sentence could also be
challenged in a post-conviction proceeding “when the
statutory requirements are met, including the one-year
limitations period.”132
The Summers court then addressed the question of
whether an expired illegal sentence could be challenged in a
habeas corpus proceeding. 133 The court noted that a
126

See State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 206 (Tenn. 2015).
Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516.
128
Id.
129
Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007).
130
Id. (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000)).
131
Id. at 256 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516).
132
Id. at 256 n.3 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(a) (2006); State
v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987)).
133
Id. at 257.
127
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petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief must be “imprisoned
or restrained of liberty.”134 Such status has been deemed “[a]
statutory prerequisite for eligibility to seek habeas corpus
relief . . . .” 135 The court explained that the term
“imprisoned” in the habeas corpus statutes referred “to
actual physical confinement or detention.” 136 The court
further explained that “restrained of liberty” was “a broader
term and encompass[ed] situations beyond actual physical
custody[,]” but only if “the challenged judgment itself
impose[d] a restraint on the petitioner’s freedom of action or
movement.” 137 As such, the court concluded that habeas
corpus relief would not lie “to address a conviction after the
sentence on the conviction [had] been fully served.” 138
However, the court ultimately determined this rule did not
bar Mr. Summers’s petition because his total effective
sentence had not been served and had not expired.139
In the years following Summers, the court in Cantrell
v. Easterling140 “returned to the topic of illegal sentences [to]
provide a more comprehensive analysis of sentencing errors
and a more general definition of illegal sentences.” 141
Cantrell will be discussed in more detail later in this article,
but for purposes of this section it is important to note that in
Cantrell the court again stated that a defendant could
challenge an illegal sentence in a post-conviction proceeding
“when the statutory requirements are met.” 142 The
134

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-21-101 (2000)).
135
Benson v. State, 153 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Tenn. 2004).
136
Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 257 (citing Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d
16, 22 (Tenn. 2004)).
137
Id. (citing Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 22).
138
Id. (citing Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23–24).
139
Id. at 258.
140
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 445 (Tenn. 2011).
141
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Cantrell,
346 S.W.3d at 448–55).
142
Id. at 453 n.7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Moody, 160 S.W.3d 512, 516 n.2 (Tenn. 2005)).
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statements in Summers and Cantrell demonstrate that, even
after the court in Moody found that habeas corpus was the
“proper procedure” for challenging an illegal sentence, the
court continued to recognize the availability of postconviction proceedings to challenge an illegal sentence.143
More recently, the court in State v. Brown discussed the
details of Moody, 144 Summers,145 and Cantrell146 at length,
but it made no mention of the fact that all three opinions
contained similar statements to that effect.
The court’s reasoning in Brown, maintaining that
“the Moody Court implicitly limited the scope of relief for
illegal sentence claims to unexpired illegal sentences[,]”147
is highly questionable in light of the fact that the Moody,
Summer, and Cantrell decisions never adopted habeas
corpus proceedings as the exclusive mechanism for
challenging an illegal sentence. Habeas corpus and postconviction have long been recognized as the “two primary
procedural avenues available in Tennessee to collaterally
attack a conviction and sentence which have become
final.”148 The Tennessee Supreme Court “[has] rejected and
will continue to reject efforts to intertwine the two
procedures.”149 For example, the court held in Taylor v. State
that “the statute of limitations for filing post-conviction
petitions in no way precludes the filing of petitions for
habeas corpus which contest void judgments.”150 Similarly,
in Summers, the court “declin[ed] to incorporate the liberal
procedural safeguards of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act
143

Id. at 206 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516).
Id.
145
Id. at 207.
146
Id. at 208.
147
Id. at 206.
148
Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Potts v. State,
833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that “[t]hese procedural
vehicles are theoretically and statutorily distinct.”).
149
Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 261 (Tenn. 2007).
150
Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 84.
144
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into the provisions governing habeas corpus.”151 Rather than
habeas corpus being the only method to challenge an illegal
sentence, as implied in the Brown opinion, there were at least
two separate and distinct procedural vehicles to challenge an
illegal sentence during the time between the Moody decision
and the enactment of Rule 36.1.
D. Post-Conviction Proceedings and Expired Sentences

In addition to the fact that habeas corpus was not the
sole mechanism for challenging an illegal sentence, a
separate factor, related to the ability to challenge an illegal
sentence via a post-conviction proceeding as stated in
Moody, Summers, and Cantrell, undermines the court’s
reasoning in Brown that “the Moody Court implicitly limited
the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims to unexpired
illegal sentences.”152 In 1977, the Tennessee Supreme Court
held in State v. McCraw that the term “in custody” found in
the Post-Conviction Relief Act meant “any possibility of
restraint on liberty.” 153 The court then reiterated several
factors concerning the mootness of a habeas petition postconviction, including the possibility that a conviction could
be used in the future to prevent a defendant from engaging
“in certain businesses,” losing the right to vote, losing the
ability to serve as a juror, and the possibility that the
conviction “could impeach the petitioner’s character at any
future criminal trial or be used as a basis for infliction of
greater punishment on [the] petitioner.”154
151

Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261.
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 206 (emphasis in original).
153
State v. McCraw, 551 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn. 1977).
154
Id. (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968); Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55–56 (1965)); see also Hickman v. State, 153
S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tenn. 2004) (narrowing the definition of “restrained of
liberty” to situations where “the challenged judgment itself imposes a
restraint upon the petitioner’s freedom of action or movement.”); Joshua
Kaiser, Revealing the Hidden Sentence: How to Add Transparency,
152
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In 1991, the court declined the State’s “invitation to
reverse McCraw.”155 Shortly after that, a panel of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals stated that McCraw stood for the
proposition “that one may file a post-conviction petition,
even after fully serving a sentence, as long as the petitioner
remain[ed] subject to collateral legal consequences due to
the challenged conviction.”156 In fact, the Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals has reviewed the denial of postconviction relief because the petitioner’s prior sentences had
been used to enhance his current sentence for a federal
conviction even though the challenged sentences expired
over ten years prior to its review.157 The Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals has recognized as recently as 2015 that “a
petition for post-conviction relief [was] permitted to attack
collaterally an expired sentence when ‘the challenged
conviction [was] used to enhance punishment.’”158
More importantly, the Tennessee Supreme Court in
State v. Hickman recognized that “the language ‘imprisoned
or restrained of liberty’ used in . . . the habeas corpus
statue[s] was not co-extensive with the ‘person in custody’

Legitimacy, and Purpose to “Collateral” Punishment Policy, 10 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 163 (2016) (analyzing the NICCC data and finding
that Tennessee has 888 “post-release hidden” sentencing laws, fifty-eight
percent of which have mandatory or automatic execution and eightythree percent of which remain in effect for the remainder of the
defendant’s life). Based on these findings, perhaps it is time to reexamine
the issue of whether collateral consequences of a conviction can justify
a habeas corpus challenge even after the conviction has “expired” given
the life-long effects and voluminous number of collateral consequences
in this state. Such a question, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
155
Albert v. State, 813 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tenn. 1991).
156
State v. Clemons, 873 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
157
Tyrice L. Sawyers, NO. M2007-02867-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL
5424031, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 31, 2008).
158
Massengill v. State, NO. E2015-00501-CCA-R3-PC, 2015 WL
7259279, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 2015) (quoting State v.
McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tenn. 1987)).
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language of the [post-conviction statutes].” 159 The court
reaffirmed that the term “in custody” “has long been broadly
construed to permit persons to collaterally challenge, by
means of a post-conviction petition, a judgment of
conviction that later may be used to enhance a sentence on
another conviction,” and that “[s]uch challenges have been
allowed even if the sentence on the challenged conviction
has been served or has expired at the time of the postconviction petition is filed.” 160 The Brown court cited
Hickman for the proposition that “habeas corpus relief may
not be granted after [the] expiration of a sentence,”161 but the
court’s discussion did not refer to Hickman’s statement that
a petitioner “may be ‘in custody’ for purposes of the PostConviction Procedure Act, but he is neither ‘imprisoned’ nor
‘restrained of liberty’ for purposes of seeking habeas corpus
relief.”162 Similarly, the Brown court did not discuss the fact
that an expired sentence could be collaterally challenged in
a post-conviction proceeding.
Until Brown, the court had never held that habeas
corpus was the exclusive procedural vehicle to challenge an
illegal sentence; instead, the court had consistently
recognized two separate and distinct procedural mechanisms
for challenging illegal sentences. In habeas corpus
proceedings, the statutory pleading requirements “are
mandatory and must be followed scrupulously.” 163 Postconviction proceedings, on the other hand, have much more
“liberal procedural safeguards” 164 and defendants can use
them to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence even
after the sentence has expired—the exact type of claims
159

Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23 n.4.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. McCraw, 551 S.W.2d 692, 694
(Tenn. 1977)).
161
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 207 (Tenn. 2015).
162
Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23 n.4.
163
Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 165 (Tenn. 1993).
164
Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 261 (Tenn. 2007).
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brought in the flood of Rule 36.1 litigation.165 This weakens
the court’s reasoning in Brown that Rule 36.1 did “not
expand the scope of relief [beyond that which is available in
a habeas corpus proceeding] and [did] not authorize the
correction of expired illegal sentences.” 166 The drafters of
Rule 36.1 were presumed to know this “‘state of the law’”
when drafting Rule 36.1,167 but the Brown court overlooked
a significant portion “of the law existing at the time” Rule
36.1 was adopted. 168 With this jurisprudential context in
mind, this article now turns to the text of Rule 36.1.
IV. Plain Language of Rule 36.1

While admitting that the view that Rule 36.1
authorized “the correction of expired illegal sentences” was
165

Admittedly, it would be difficult to challenge an expired illegal
sentence in a post-conviction setting due to the one-year statute of
limitations. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(a) (2012). The challenge
would have to involve a misdemeanor sentence or the petition would
have to show a statutory or due process reason for tolling the statute of
limitations. Id. § 40-30-102(b) (listing the statutory bases for tolling the
statute of limitations); Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 23 (Tenn. 2014)
(listing instances where the Tennessee Supreme Court has tolled the
post-conviction statute of limitations on due process grounds).
Additionally, the case law is unclear as to exactly what constitutional
right is at issue when an illegal sentence is challenged in a postconviction proceeding. Mahler and McConnell address alleged illegal
sentences in the post-conviction context without addressing this issue. In
at least one opinion, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that,
in the context of a guilty plea, failure to inform the petitioner he was
agreeing to an illegal sentence constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel which caused the defendant to unknowingly and involuntarily
enter into a guilty plea. See, e.g., Meriweather v. State, NO. M200802329-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 27947, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7,
2010).
166
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.
167
Lee Med., Inc., v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010) (citing
Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn.
2005)).
168
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 205.
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“one possible interpretation,” the court in Brown rejected
that interpretation as unreasonable “in light of the expressed
purpose of Rule 36.1, its language, and the jurisprudential
background from which it developed.”169 In looking at the
text of Rule 36.1, the court stated that the phrase “at any
time,” as used in Rule 36.1, had “no bearing” on the issue of
whether Rule 36.1 authorized the correction of expired
illegal sentences.170 Instead, the court argued that the phrase
“at any time” simply meant (1) that an illegal sentence could
be corrected after it became final and (2) that there was no
statute of limitations on Rule 36.1 motions. 171 Also, in
looking at the text of Rule 36.1, the court stated that the rule
differed “from the procedure applicable to habeas corpus
petitions challenging illegal sentences” in “at least two
ways.” First, the rule allowed the State to challenge an illegal
sentence. Second, it required the motion to be filed in the
trial court where the judgment of conviction was entered
rather than the county where the petitioner was
incarcerated. 172 Finally, the court reasoned that, had the
drafters of Rule 36.1 intended for it to differ from the court’s
“prior decisions refusing to grant habeas corpus relief for
expired illegal sentences,” they “almost certainly” would
have “included language clearly expressing that intent . . .
.”173
The court’s reasoning in Brown regarding the phrase
“at any time” has led one Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals judge to question how that term could “mean one
thing in the text of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36
and yet mean an entirely different thing in the text of Rule
36.1?” 174 The court concluded at the end of the Brown
169

Id. at 210.
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 209.
173
Id. at 211.
174
State v. Bennett, NO. E2015-00510-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL
8773599, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2015) (Witt, J., concurring).
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opinion that Rule 36, addressing clerical errors, did apply to
expired sentences because Rule 36 did not “authorize courts
to grant relief from expired illegal sentences.”175 However,
nowhere in Rule 36 or Rule 36.1 is there any language to
suggest the two rules are different because one could be used
to grant relief “from expired illegal sentences.” Similar to
the language found in the original text of Rule 36.1, Rule 36
stated that trial courts “may at any time correct clerical
mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record,
and errors in the record arising from oversight or
omission.” 176 This has been a long-standing rule in
Tennessee 177 and is similar to prior Tennessee case law
holding that “where a judgment is void then there is no
judgment and consequently the [trial] court does not lose
jurisdiction over the matter.”178 In light of this, there appears
to be no textual reason to interpret the phrase “at any time”
differently in Rule 36.1 from how the court treated the
phrase in Rule 36.
In addition to its unique interpretation of the phrase
“at any time,” the court in Brown also downplayed the
differences between habeas corpus procedure and Rule 36.1.
As previously stated, the pleading requirements in habeas
corpus proceedings “are mandatory and must be followed
scrupulously.” 179 To that end, petitioners seeking habeas
corpus relief are required to state in their petitions that they
175

Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 213 (emphasis in original).
Compare TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36 (2013) (amended 2016), with TENN.
R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a) (2013) (amended 2016) (stating that either “the
defendant or the state may seek to correct an illegal sentence . . . .”).
177
See Bailey v. State, 280 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tenn. 1955) (noting that
trial courts have the power “to correct every mistake apparent on the face
of the record”); State v. Disney, 37 Tenn. 598, 601 (1858) (“[A]fter the
record is made up, and the term [of court] closed, [the record] admits of
no alteration, by the same court, unless for some mistake patent upon the
face of the record, or proceedings in the case.”).
178
State ex rel Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tenn. 1951).
179
Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 165 (Tenn. 1993).
176
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are “illegally restrained of liberty” and to attach a copy of
the alleged void judgment “or a satisfactory reason given for
its absence.” 180 Furthermore, the habeas corpus statutes
provide a method of summary dismissal “[i]f, from the
showing of the petitioner, the plaintiff would not be entitled
to any relief, the writ may be refused . . . .”181 Put another
way, “when a habeas corpus petition fails to establish that a
judgment is void [upon the face of the judgment or record],
a trial court may dismiss the petition without a hearing[]” or
the appointment of counsel.182
The original text of Rule 36.1, on the other hand, had
no mechanism for summarily dismissing claims and allowed
for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing if
the motion merely stated “a colorable claim” and was not
limited to proof on the face of the record. 183 These
differences were in addition to the ones outlined by the court
in Brown.184 To that end, the original text of Rule 36.1 was
much more in line with the “liberal procedural
safeguards” 185 of post-conviction proceedings, which,
likewise, required the trial court to appoint counsel and hold
an evidentiary hearing when a petition states a colorable
claim.186 In fact, the court in Wooden actually adopted the
definition of “colorable claim” used in the post-conviction
context for use in Rule 36.1 proceedings.187 In light of this,
the court’s interpretation of the plain language of Rule 36.1
failed to construe the rule “in a way that is natural, ordinary,

180

TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-21-107(b) (2012).
Id. § 29-21-109.
182
Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 260.
183
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(b) (2013) (amended 2016); see also State v.
Talley, No. E2014–01313–CCA–R3–CD 2014 WL 7366257, at *2
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2014).
184
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 209 (Tenn. 2015).
185
Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 261 (Tenn. 2007).
186
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 28, §6(B).
187
State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 592–93 (Tenn. 2015).
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and unforced.” 188 In fact, court could only point to one
similarity between a Rule 36.1 motion and a habeas corpus
proceeding—the definition of “illegal sentence.”189
V. Definition of Illegal Sentence

A key factor the court cited in Brown to support its
conclusion that Rule 36.1 “was not . . . intended to expand
the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims” was that Rule
36.1 defined “‘illegal sentence’ exactly as [this] Court had
already defined that term in the habeas corpus context.”190
But, the court’s reasoning in this regard suffered from the
same flaw as its reasoning regarding the jurisprudential
context of Rule 36.1: it assumed that the definition of “illegal
sentence” found in Rule 36.1 had exclusively been applied
in “the habeas corpus context.” 191 However, a closer
examination of that definition and its development in
Tennessee case law proves that is not the case.
The original text of Rule 36.1 defined an “illegal
sentence” as “one that [was] not authorized by the applicable
statutes or that directly contravene[d] an applicable
statute.”192 The Brown opinion refers to its companion case,
Wooden, for the proposition that Rule 36.1’s definition of
“illegal sentence” was “coextensive with, and actually
mirror[s], the definition this Court has applied to that term in

188

Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795, 808 (Tenn. 2015).
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 209. While not cited to in Brown, the language
in subsection (c)(3) of Rule 36.1 dealing with illegal sentences when
used as material components of a plea agreement is similar to language
used in the court’s habeas corpus cases. See Summers, 212 S.W.3d at
258–59. However, for a demonstration of the principle that a defendant
can withdraw his guilty plea in such a situation pre-dating Moody and its
progeny, see State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978).
190
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.
191
Id.
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TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a)(2) (2013) (amended 2016).
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the habeas corpus context.”193 In Wooden, the court held that
the definition of “illegal sentence” found in Rule 36.1
“mirror[ed] [the one] adopted by this Court in [Cantrell v.
Easterling] . . . .”194 In Cantrell, the court held that an illegal
sentence was “one which [was] ‘in direct contravention of
the express provisions of [an applicable statute], and
consequently [is] a nullity.’” 195 The Cantrell court also
added that it would “include within the rubric [of] ‘illegal
sentences’ those sentences which [were] not authorized
under the applicable statutory scheme.” 196 In essence, the
definition of “illegal sentence” found in Rule 36.1 and
Cantrell concerns two types of sentences: (1) sentences in
direct contravention of an applicable statute and (2)
sentences “not authorized by the applicable statutes.”197
In State v. Burkhart, the court defined an illegal
sentence as one “in direct contravention of the express
provisions of [an applicable statute] . . . .” and made no
mention of sentences not authorized by the applicable
statutes.198 However, in State v. Leathers, one of the cases
cited by the court in Burkhart, the Oregon Supreme Court
defined an “illegal sentence” as a sentence “beyond the
bounds of [the trial court’s] sentencing authority . . . .” that
would subsequently be “void for lack of authority and thus
totally without legal effect.”199 Likewise, the court in State
v. Mahler, a post-conviction case pre-dating Cantrell by over
two decades, recognized the Burkhart definition of an illegal
193

Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 209 (citing State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585
(Tenn. 2015)).
194
Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 594.
195
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2011) (alteration
in original) (quoting State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.
1978)).
196
Id. (citing Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2010)).
197
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a)(2) (2013) (amended 2016); Cantrell, 346
S.W.3d at 452 (citing Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 759).
198
Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978).
199
State v. Leathers, 531 P.2d 901, 903 (Or. 1975) (citations omitted).
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sentence and that there had also been cases “where sentences
were imposed which were higher or lower than that
authorized by the statute designating the punishment for the
crime.”200 The Mahler court determined that such sentences
were “held subject to being later vacated or corrected.”201
The court reaffirmed this principle in McConnell v. State,
another post-conviction case.202
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in State v.
Reliford cited McConnell for the proposition that a sentence,
which “the trial court lacked the statutory authority to
impose,” was an illegal sentence. 203 Reliford, which
predated Cantrell by over a decade, involved a challenge to
an illegal sentence brought in the trial court via a common
law motion to correct an illegal sentence and subsequently
brought to the intermediate appellate court via the common
law writ of certiorari. 204 McConnell was also cited by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in Stephenson v. Carlton for the
proposition that a sentence with “no statutory basis” was
“illegal” and that a guilty plea agreement could not “salvage
an illegal sentence or otherwise create authority for the
imposition of a sentence that [had] not been authorized by
statute.”205 Stephenson was cited by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in Davis v. State for the proposition that trial courts
lack jurisdiction to impose a sentence not authorized by the
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State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987).
Id. (citing State v. Hamlin, 655 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1983)).
202
McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 799–800 (Tenn. 2000).
203
State v. Reliford, NO. W1999-00826-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL
1473846, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2000) (citing McConnell, 12
S.W.3d at 795, 799–800).
204
Id.
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Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tenn. 2000) (citing
McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 799).
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applicable statutes. 206 The Cantrell court then cited Davis
when it articulated the two-part definition.207
The definition of “illegal sentence” in Cantrell and
Rule 36.1 was not unique to the habeas corpus context, as
the court suggested in Wooden and Brown. 208 Rather, that
definition had been used by Tennessee courts in examining
illegal sentence claims in post-conviction proceedings, in
proceedings utilizing the common law motion to correct an
illegal sentence, and in habeas corpus proceedings. In fact,
the only aspect of the Cantrell definition that differed from
the original definition of an illegal sentence found in
Burkhart was the inclusion of sentences not authorized by
the applicable statute. However, the Tennessee Supreme
Court first recognized those types of sentences as illegal in
the post-conviction context (several years before Cantrell),
not the habeas corpus context as asserted in Wooden and
Brown.209 As such, the definition of “illegal sentence” found
in Rule 36.1 was not a definition adopted solely from the
“habeas corpus context” but, instead, was simply the
definition of “illegal sentence” found generally in Tennessee
law and applied across all the procedural vehicles used to
challenge illegal sentences prior to Moody and Cantrell.210
VI. Double Jeopardy and Rule 36.1

In addition to the text and jurisprudential context of
Rule 36.1, the Brown court also said that interpreting Rule
36.1 to allow for the correction of expired illegal sentences
“could potentially produce absurd, and even arguably
206

Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2010).
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2010).
208
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015).
209
See generally Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200; Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585.
210
See generally Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200; Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585;
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2010); Moody v. State,
160 S.W. 3d 512 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn.
1978).
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unconstitutional results.” 211 Chiefly, the court stated that
under such an interpretation of Rule 36.1 “the State would
be entitled to correct an illegally lenient sentence, even after
the sentence had been fully served.” 212 The Brown court
imagined that “[a] defendant faced with the prospect of
returning to prison after already serving his sentence would
undoubtedly raise many objections . . . including
constitutional objections[,]”213 and that “the ‘outcry’ would
be unimaginable were ‘the State [to] start using Rule 36.1 to
jail untold numbers of citizens that by all indications have
completely served their sentences . . . .’”214 The court stated
that it would not interpret Rule 36.1 to allow for the
correction of expired illegal sentences because such an
interpretation had “the potential to result in unconstitutional
applications” of the rule.215
There are several problems with the Brown court’s
analysis with respect to the danger of Rule 36.1 being
applied unconstitutionally. First, to the extent that the court
differentiated between illegally lenient sentences and other
illegal sentences in Brown, its reasoning was in direct
contravention of the court’s prior holding that a trial court
“lacks jurisdiction to impose an agreed sentence that is
illegal, even an illegally lenient one.”216 Put another way, an
illegally lenient sentence is just as void as any other type of
illegal sentence. Additionally, the question of whether a
government’s attempt to correct an expired illegally lenient
sentence would violate constitutional protections against
double jeopardy is not as straightforward as the court
211

Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.
Id. (emphasis in original).
213
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Selavka, 14 N.E.3d 933, 941 (Mass.
2014)).
214
Id. (quoting Lee v. State, 2015 WL 2330063, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App.
May 13, 2015) (Williams, J., dissenting)) (alterations in original).
215
Id.
216
Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tenn. 2007) (citing
McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tenn. 2000)).
212
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presented it in Brown. 217 Admittedly, at least one
jurisdiction has issued a blanket pronouncement that such an
action would violate double jeopardy protections. 218
However, other jurisdictions have taken a more nuanced
view of the issue, noting that the issue requires the weighing
of a defendant’s interest in finality of the sentence against a
state’s interest in the correction of the illegality 219 and,
moreover, that the passage of time is a key factor in
determining whether a defendant has a legitimate
expectation of finality in an illegal sentence.220 Further still,
at least one jurisdiction has concluded that despite a sentence
being already served by a defendant, a “[d]efendant [cannot]
have a legitimate expectation of finality in the severity of the
original sentence because it was illegally lenient . . . .”221
217

Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.
See State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(quoting Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000))
(stating that “where a sentence has already been served, even if it is an
illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased
sentence”).
219
See State v. Trieb, 533 N.W.2d 678, 681 (N.D. 1995) (citing United
States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1992); DeWitt v.
Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1993)) (noting that a defendant
“cannot acquire a legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence which
is illegal, because such a sentence remains subject to modification” but
recognizing that in some cases correction could be “so unfair that it must
be deemed inconsistent with fundamental notions of fairness” and
providing a balancing test).
220
Commonwealth v. Selavka, 14 N.E.3d 933, 941, 944 (Mass. 2014)
(emphasis added) (recognizing that “a defendant’s legitimate
expectation of finality may well be diminished when his sentence is
illegal” but concluding that “even an illegal sentence, with the passage
of time, acquire[s] a finality that bars further punitive changes
detrimental to the defendant”).
221
People v. Thompson, NO. 4609/99, 2009 WL 348370, at *3, *5 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 11, 2009) (also noting that the defendant’s “expectation of
finality” was further “undermined by the additional legal circumstance
that New York courts have the inherent power to correct an illegal
sentence”).
218
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The question of whether the State could seek to
correct an expired, illegally lenient sentence, however, was
not dispositive to the claim at issue in Brown. The motion to
correct an illegal sentence at issue in Brown had been
brought by Mr. Brown, not the State.222 It is well established
that “[w]hen the accused himself procures a judgment to be
set aside upon his own initiative and he voluntarily accepts
the result, then he cannot by his own act avoid the jeopardy
in which he stands and then assert it as a bar to a subsequent
jeopardy.”223 As such, the question of whether use of Rule
36.1 by the State to correct an expired, illegally lenient
sentence was not before the court and, therefore, not
necessary for the determination of Mr. Brown’s case.
Accordingly, the court should not have considered in its
analysis the possible “constitutional objections” of a
theoretical defendant in that situation. 224 Ultimately, there
was no constitutional impediment to Mr. Brown’s argument
that he could use Rule 36.1 to correct his expired illegally
lenient sentences.
VII. Mootness

Prior to the court’s decision in Brown, a panel of the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the
expiration of Mr. Brown’s sentences rendered his motion to
correct them moot. 225 Citing the mootness doctrine, the
222

State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 202 (Tenn. 2015).
State v. Clemons, 873 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting
State v. Collins, 698 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985)).
224
Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) (observing that
“under Tennessee law, courts do not decide constitutional questions
unless resolution is absolutely necessary for determination of the case
and the rights of the parties” and that “courts should avoid deciding
constitutional issues” if “a case can be resolved on non-constitutional
grounds”).
225
State v. Brown, NO. E2014-00673-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 5483011,
at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2014).
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panel concluded that Mr. Brown’s motion to correct his
expired illegal sentences failed to present a “live
controversy” and that the case could “no longer provide
relief” to Mr. Brown.226 To support this reasoning, the panel
cited to cases from other jurisdictions that had “concluded
that a challenge to the legality of a sentence [became] moot
once the sentence [had] been served.”227 However, the cases
to which the panel’s decision referred cited little to no
authority to support this reasoning. 228 One of the cases
contained a vigorous dissent, which noted that even after a
sentence is served the sentence “still exists” unless it has
been expunged and that there are “[a] countless number of
situations [that] occur where a prison sentence has collateral
consequences[]” that can plague a defendant in the future.229
Despite the fact that the Tennessee Supreme Court
had previously referred to an expired illegal sentence claim
brought in a habeas corpus proceeding as moot,230 the court
in Brown 231 rejected the mootness argument of the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The court noted that
the question of whether a defendant was imprisoned or
restrained of liberty was a “separate and distinct” question
from the issue of whether a “challenged conviction’s
226

Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6 (citing State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2012); Barnes v. State, 31 A.3d 203, 207 (Md. 2011); Sanchez v. State,
982 P.2d 149, 150–51 (Wyo. 1999)).
228
See Barnes, 31 A.3d at 210 (citing only Sanchez to support its
reasoning); Sanchez, 982 P.2d at 150–51 (citing no authority to support
its conclusion). Additionally, the rules in all of these other jurisdictions,
unlike Rule 36.1, did not provide a method to attack a defendant’s
underlying conviction. See MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 4-345(a)
(West 1984); WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 35; FLA. R. CRIM. P. RULE 3.800.
229
Barnes, 31 A.3d at 212 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
230
See Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 257–58 (Tenn. 2007) (stating
that the court would have accepted the State’s argument that the
defendant’s illegal sentence claim was moot if the defendant had fully
served his total effective sentence).
231
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211 n.12.
227
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collateral consequences [could] prevent . . . [it] from
becoming moot.” 232 The court concluded that “[c]ollateral
consequences [could] prevent a case from becoming moot in
the traditional sense of the mootness doctrine” but that Rule
36.1, in light of the opinion’s interpretation of the rule, was
“not an appropriate avenue for seeking relief from collateral
consequences.” 233 While this article has laid out a strong
case against the court’s view that Rule 36.1 was not an
appropriate vehicle for challenging the collateral
consequences of an expired illegal sentence, I agree with the
court’s reasoning regarding the inapplicability of the
mootness doctrine to expired illegal sentence claims.
The court has stated in the past that showing a
defendant is imprisoned or restrained of liberty is “[a]
statutory prerequisite for eligibility to seek habeas corpus
relief . . . .” 234 Further, the court has declined to include
restraints on a defendant’s liberty that it deemed “merely a
collateral consequence of the challenged judgment” as
cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding.235 As previously
discussed, the court has also held that an expired sentence
may be challenged in a post-conviction proceeding.236 In so
holding, the court stated that “a criminal case is moot only if
it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal
consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged
conviction.”237 As noted by the dissenting opinion in Barnes
and the Tennessee Supreme Court in McCraw, there are
numerous possible collateral consequences that flow from an
expired illegal sentence. As such, the mootness doctrine
would not apply to bar expired illegal sentence claims under
Rule 36.1.
232

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting May v. Carlton, 245
S.W.3d 340, 356 n.22 (Koch, J., dissenting)).
233
Id.
234
Benson v. State, 153 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Tenn. 2004).
235
Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tenn. 2004).
236
See, e.g., State v. McCraw, 551 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn. 1977).
237
Id. (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1965)).
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VIII. Conclusion

In Brown, the Tennessee Supreme Court overlooked
a significant portion of the “jurisprudential context” from
which Rule 36.1 originated, interpreted the plain language of
Rule 36.1 in a way that was not “natural, ordinary, and
unforced,”238 and unnecessarily raised a constitutional issue
that had not been presented for the court’s review. The court
based its reasoning upon the assumption that because of its
opinion in Moody, habeas corpus was the sole procedural
vehicle for challenging an illegal sentence and Rule 36.1
thereby implicitly incorporated the habeas corpus statutes’
procedural ban on challenging expired illegal sentences.
This reasoning overlooked the fact that the court had
repeatedly stated that some illegal sentences could be
challenged in a post-conviction proceeding, a proceeding
that has long been held to allow for challenges to expired
sentences. Furthermore, the court’s interpretation of the
plain language of Rule 36.1 discounted the fact that the rule
more closely resembled a post-conviction proceeding, rather
than a habeas corpus proceeding. Likewise, the one portion
of Rule 36.1 the court cited as being identical to habeas
corpus case law, the definition of the term “illegal sentence,”
actually predated Moody and has been used by courts outside
the habeas corpus context. Additionally, the court’s
constitutional concerns and the doctrine of mootness both
proved to be irrelevant to the issues presented in Brown. All
of this leads to the conclusion that the court erred in
interpreting Rule 36.1 to not allow for the correction of
expired illegal sentences.
Nevertheless, Brown and its companion case
Wooden will likely be mere footnotes in Tennessee’s
jurisprudential history. On December 29, 2015, roughly four
weeks after Brown and Wooden were filed, the Tennessee
Supreme Court entered an order that replaced the original
238
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text of Rule 36.1 in its entirety, effective July 1, 2016.239 The
order removed the phrase “at any time” from Rule 36.1 and
replaced it with a requirement that, except for one narrow
exception, the motion “must be filed before the sentence set
forth in the judgment order expires.” 240 Rule 36.1 now
requires the moving party to include “a copy of the relevant
judgment order(s)” with the motion, allows the movant to
include “other supporting documents,” and requires the
movant “to state whether the motion is the first motion to
correct the illegal sentence.” 241 The new Advisory
Commission Comment to Rule 36.1 states that the rule’s
definition of “illegal sentence” “incorporates the definition .
. . set forth in Cantrell.”242 The new version of Rule 36.1 also
permits summary denial of motions that do not set forth a
colorable claim.243
The new Rule 36.1 also “limit[s] the circumstances
under which relief may be granted where the defendant has
entered into a plea bargain which contains an illegal
sentence.”244 Trial courts are now required to deny motions
when the defendant has “benefitted from the bargained-for
illegal sentence.” 245 As an example, the new Advisory
Commission Comment states that when a defendant has
received illegal concurrent sentences, that defendant cannot
bring a motion to correct the illegal sentences.246 Rule 36.1
additionally provides, in new subsection (d), a narrow
exception to the rule’s prohibition on challenging expired
illegal sentences.247 Subsection (d) allows the State “to seek
239
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to correct a judgment order that failed to impose a statutorily
required sentence of lifetime community supervision” if the
motion is “filed no later than ninety days after the sentence
imposed in the judgment order expires.”248
In essence, the amendment to Rule 36.1 wiped out
the original version and replaced it with a new version
explicitly in line with the court’s interpretation of the
original Rule 36.1 in Brown and Wooden.249 The amendment
to Rule 36.1 replaced the liberal procedural safeguards,
similar to those of post-conviction proceedings found in the
original text of the rule, with more stringent procedural
requirements reminiscent of those found in habeas corpus
proceedings. Also, the addition of subsection (d) is
interesting, given the court’s statements in Brown allowing
for the correction of expired illegal sentences that “could
potentially produce absurd” results. These additions are
especially interesting in light of the court’s concern that
allowing the State to correct expired sentences had “the
potential to result in unconstitutional applications” of the
rule.250 Based on the court’s reasoning in Brown, any use by
the State of subsection (d) would be open to an obvious
constitutional challenge on double jeopardy grounds.
Also troubling is the new Rule 36.1’s language
regarding defendants’ having “benefitted from the
bargained-for illegal sentence.” This portion of the new rule
seemingly ignores the precedent that a trial court “lacks
jurisdiction to impose an agreed sentence that is illegal, even
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an illegally lenient one.”251 Additionally, while it is true that
these defendants may have served shorter sentences on the
front end, most of the defendants challenging illegal
sentences under Rule 36.1 were incarcerated in state or
federal prison, and their new sentences were enhanced by
prior convictions infected with the challenged illegal
sentence. It is hard to imagine that a defendant “benefits”
from continuing to be exposed to such a collateral
consequence. Moreover, the Tennessee Supreme Court
adopted the amendments to Rule 36.1 without much thought
to these issues or the shortcomings of the Brown and Wooden
decisions. Perhaps, after the issuance of the Brown and
Wooden opinions, the court was reminded of the ancient
maxim, “[b]lessed be the amending hand.”252
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